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Leibniz’s pre-established harmonious unfolding of individuals’ essences is rightly 
granted a pivotal role in his metaphysics. Most commonly understood in terms of the 
unfolding of monadic sequences of perceptions and appetitions, the closely related 
theories of organic-body preformation and the unfolding into visibility of plants and 
animals from their seeds have until recently largely been ignored.2 In this paper, we 
question why, despite the thoroughgoing mechanical preformation of organic bodies, 
Leibniz insisted that the preformed seeds of animals and other living things must 
contain souls, entelechies or substantial forms. The issue is raised through contrast 





Leibniz made no secret of his support for Descartes’ modernising mission to expose 
the scholastic misconception that souls, substantial forms or entelechies and their 
perceptions and appetitions have any explanatory value within the physical sciences.  
In true Cartesian spirit, he insisted that physical mechanisms are “sufficient to 
produce the organic bodies of animals” (Preface to the Theodicy, H 64; GP VI, 40). 
At the same time, however, he also believed that the generation of organic bodies 
must be supplemented by “the pre-formation already completely organic in the seeds 
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1 With grateful thanks to the organizer, Adrian Nita, and to the participants of the Oltenia Colloquium 
in Early Modern Philosophy at which this paper was first presented in draft.  
2 For an extended discussion of Leibniz's theory and its historical context, see Smith (2011, 165-196). 
The topic has also been addressed by Duchesneau (2010) and by Wilson (1997).    
 
of the bodies that come into existence, contained in those of the bodies whence they 
spring, right back to the primary seeds” (ibid.). Furthermore, Leibniz insisted that all 
preformed seeds, whether original or primary seeds or subsequent seeds,3 contain 
souls. Yet, it is clear that Leibniz regarded preformation as applying only to the 
organic body and not to the whole corporeal substance comprising the organic body 
together with its dominant soul or substantial form.  Hence, in the Preface to the 
Theodicy, he described preformation as “completely organic in the seeds” and later, in 
the text itself, he would refer to “this great number of souls and of animals, or at least 
of living organic bodies which are in the seeds”, and explain that only the organic 
bodies of souls that are “destined to attain one day to human nature” are already 
“preformed and predisposed to assume one day the human shape” (Theodicy, §397; H 
361; GP VI, 352). The organic bodies of "other small animals or seminal living 
beings” are also preformed, although, destined never to become the bodies of human 
beings, their bodies will accordingly only ever assume non-human shapes (ibid.). 
However, if preformation and mechanism suffice to explain the various successive 
states of the organic bodies of creatures, why did Leibniz consider it important in that 
context to highlight the fact that their seeds contain souls? Unless the fact of souls in 
seeds is a mere coincidence, their presence requires justification.  
 Leibniz’s claim relies on two assumptions, neither of which is self-evidently 
necessary. First, Leibniz had supposed that all organic bodies are living bodies and 
second, that all living bodies are ensouled. Among his contemporaries, neither 
assumption enjoyed universal acceptance. Anne Conway felt no compulsion to 
endorse the first.  She used the term ‘organic’ to refer to any object with parts 
arranged in an organised and functional manner. Thus, for Conway, a lifeless clock, 
even though it has no “vital principle of motion in it” is “simply an organic body”.4 
Meanwhile, Malebranche denied the second assumption.  He believed that all 
preformed bodies, though they are living bodies, should be regarded as inanimate or 
soul-less mechanisms. Lacking feeling, perception or desire, Malebranche’s 
preformed seeds and other living bodies are therefore far closer in kind to inorganic 
physical objects, such as mountains, rocks and Conway’s clock, than they are to 
                                                 
3 Leibniz believed that God created all souls and organic bodies at once.  Hence seeds are not primary 
in the sense of being created first, before others. Rather, at the moment of Creation, all seeds were 
‘primary seeds’.  The phrase ‘primary seeds’ presumably refers to the initial states of seeds, that is, to 
seeds as they were when first created. Correspondingly, non-primary or subsequent seeds can be 
understood as seeds in their post-creation developed states.   
4 Conway (1996, 64).   
living, sensing human beings whose minds or souls God fills with the sensations of 
colour, taste, touch, sound and smell that enable them to perceive physical objects in 
the external world. Malebranche appealed solely to the seed’s preformation to ensure 
that everything is in place to allow that its future states are unfolded sequentially 
simply by the natural motions and collisions of bodies in accordance with the regular 
laws of motion. Given Leibniz’s agreement on this point,5 the question is raised: if 




2. Malebranche’s Preformationism 
 
Malebranche had proposed that the preformation of bodies together with the 
mechanical laws of nature could account for the future unfolding of living animals 
and plants from seeds contained in the very first members of each species created by 
God at the beginning of the world. A single seed contains the seeds that will become 
its immediate offspring as well as the seeds of all the offspring that will be produced 
from that line down the years forevermore.  All whose lineage will later be traceable 
back to the first parent are already present in seed-form in that first parent’s seeds: 
“each seed contains the entire species it can conserve” (Dialogues on Metaphysics 
and on Religion, Dialogue X; DMR 175; R-L II, 852).  For instance, “in a single 
apple seed there are apple trees, apples, and apple seeds, standing in the proportion of 
a fully grown tree to the tree in its seed, for an infinite, or nearly infinite number of 
centuries” (Search After Truth, LO 27; R-L I, 57).  
 The role of nature (or mechanism) is merely,   
 
to unfold these tiny trees by providing perceptible growth [un accroissement sensible] 
for that outside its seed, and imperceptible yet very real growth in proportion to their 
size, for those thought to be in their seed – for it cannot be doubted that there are 
bodies sufficiently small to get in between the fibers of these trees thought to be in 
their seed and thus to serve as food for them (ibid.).  
 
                                                 
5 Leibniz’s Fifth letter to Clarke, ALC 93, GP VII, 417-18. 
The process may involve some re-configuration or re-shaping of the parts or organs of 
the seeds,6 by which Malebranche meant that the relations and proportions among the 
pre-existing parts in the seeds might not be exactly the same as those in the resulting 
plant or animal. The parts of the bee, for instance, will not have “the same proportion 
of size, solidity, and configuration between its parts” when it exists in the larva as it 
will do after it has emerged as a fully-grown bee. Similarly, a chicken’s head “when it 
is in the egg and appears in the form of larvae, is much larger than all the rest of the 
body, and … the bones assume their consistency only after the other parts” 
(Dialogues on Metaphysics and on Religion, Dialogue XI, DMR 195; R-L II, 873). 
 From this stance, there is no need for non-human animals, plants and their 
parts, including their seeds, to be endowed with sensing souls. They are simply 
mechanical machines. On Malebranche’s thoroughly Cartesian account, “all the parts 
of animals are merely mechanical, and … they can be moved without a soul merely 
by the impression of objects and by their particular constitution” (Search After Truth, 
LO 324; R-L I, 469).7  The process of unfolding what is already present in miniature 
in the seed involves only mechanical growth or augmentation. The accumulation of 
additional matter simply enlarges, while motion re-configures, parts or organs that are 
already present in miniature. All living things that will appear in due course, from 
tulips and frogs to the bodies of human beings, already exist in the seeds of their 
progenitors as tiny versions of their future selves.  
 
An entire tulip is seen in the seed of a tulip bulb. Likewise, a chicken that is perhaps 
entirely formed is seen in the seed of a fresh egg that has not been hatched.8 Frogs are 
to be seen in frogs’ eggs, and still other animals will be seen in their seed when we 
have sufficient skill and experience to discover them.9 … We ought to accept, in 
addition, that the body of every man and beast born till the end of time was perhaps 
produced at the creation of the world (Search After Truth, LO 27; R-L I, 57).10 
 
                                                 
6 “Configuration”, Malebranche defines as, “the shape of the unobservable parts of which large bodies 
are composed” (Dialogues on Metaphysics and on Religion, Dialogue X; DMR 181; R-L II, 859). 
7 See also, Dialogues on Metaphysics and on Religion, Dialogue XI DMR 195-96; R-L II, 874. 
8 Author note: “The germ of the egg is under a tiny white spot that is on the yolk. See the Liv. de 
formatione pulli in ovo, by Malpighi”. 
9 Author note: “See Miraculum naturae, by Swammerdam”. 
10 Similarly, of trees, that they exist ““in the seeds of their seeds in miniature” (Search After Truth, LO 
26; R-L I, 56). 
All that mechanism was required to do was to enlarge the organs and perhaps re-
arrange the organs of the miniature animalcular figure in the seed. Extended matter in 
motion was considered quite sufficient to enable nature to fulfil its role of unfolding 
through augmentation and re-configuration what was already contained in the seed.11 
Nothing more is needed. Animal and plant souls, on the Malebranchean model, are 
redundant.12  
 
3. Leibniz’s Malebranchianism 
  
There are indications of a Malebranchian-style animalculism in Leibniz’s accounts of 
preformation also. For instance, Leibniz likened the never-ending, nested structure of 
organic living bodies to the layers of clothes on Harlequin: 
 
the machines of nature are as imperishable as souls themselves, and the animal 
together with its soul persists for ever. I can explain my meaning better with the help 
of a pleasant though very silly example: it is as if someone tried to strip Harlequin on 
the stage but could never finish the task because he had on so many costumes, one on 
top of the other (New Essays, A VI, 6, 328; RB 328).  
 
Leibniz also employed Malebranche’s language of “growth” or “augmentation” to 
describe the unfolding of the animal or plant that already exists “in miniature” in the 
preformed seed. The early microscopists had uncovered a previously hidden world of 
miniscule creatures in all manner of everyday substances from dung to chalk and 
Leibniz, following Malebranche, 13  appealed to their investigations to support his 
claims that “the apparent generation of a new plant or new animal is only a growth 
(un accroissement) and transformation of a plant or animal which already subsists in 
                                                 
11 See Dialogues on Metaphysics and on Religion, Dialogue X (DMR 188-89; R-L II 866-67) for 
Malebranche’s account of how the motion of matter fashions the parts in the seeds into the organised 
bodies of humans, animals and plants.  
12 Malebranche offered various negative reasons to support his denial of animal souls, among them 
being the avoidance of divine injustice. Regarding all pain or suffering as God’s way of punishing 
sinful behaviour, recognising that any feeling creature will at times experience pain, and assuming that 
animals are innocent creatures, we can be assured that an “infinitely just and omnipotent God” will not 
provide animals with souls that enable them to be sensible of their circumstances (Search After Truth, 
LO 323; R-L I, 467). 
13 For instance, Search After Truth, LO 26; R-L I, 56. Malebranche’s writings display an impressive 
awareness and understanding of contemporary scientific studies of the natural world.  Wilson (1997: 
158) suggests that it was his reading Malebranche’s Search After Truth that led Leibniz to appreciate 
the metaphysical import of microscopy.    
the seeds” (Leibniz to Sophie, 6 February 1706, Strickland (2011, 348), GP VII, 568); 
that “living animals as well as plants already exist in miniature (en petit) in the seeds 
before conception” (Considerations on the Principles of Life and on Plastic Natures, 
GP VI, 543; L 589); and that “death, like generation, is only the transformation of the 
same animal, which is sometimes augmented and sometimes diminished” (ibid.).  
 Given Malebranche’s use of the microscopists’ observations, Leibniz’s 
appeals to those whom he considered the “best observers of our time” (Jan 
Swammerdam, Marcello Malpighi and Antonie van Leeuwenhoek)14 afforded him the 
opportunity to align his preformationism explicitly and in public to that of the 
Oratorian. In the New System of the Nature and Communication of Substances, 
published in 1695, and again in the Essays on Theodicy, published in 1710, he 
numbered Malebranche amongst from whom he garnered support. Claiming that “the 
transformations of Swammerdam, Malpighi, and Leeuwenhoek … have made it 
easier for me to admit that animals and all other organized substances have no 
beginning … and that their apparent generation is only a development, a kind of 
augmentation”, he immediately added that he had also “noticed that the author of the 
Search After Truth, Régis, Hartsoeker and other able persons have held opinions not 
far removed from this” (New System, GP IV, 480; AG 140). Fifteen years later, 
Leibniz once again alluded publicly to the support for his views from Malebranche in 
conjunction with others, including the microscopists:  
 
It is thus my belief that those souls which one day shall be human souls, like those of 
other species, have been in the seed, and in the progenitors as far back as Adam, and 
have consequently existed since the beginning of things, always in a kind of organic 
body.  On this point it seems that M. Swammerdam, Father Malebranche, M. Bayle, 
Mr. Pitcairne, M. Hartsoeker and numerous other very able persons share my opinion.  
This doctrine is also sufficiently confirmed by the microscope observations of M. 
Leeuwenhoek and other good observers (Theodicy, §91; GP VI, 152; H 172). 
 
While technically accurate, Leibniz’s attempt in the Theodicy to situate himself 
amongst Malebranche and other well-respected figures can easily breed 
misunderstanding if not read entirely literally. For though it is true that Malebranche 
                                                 
14  New System, GP IV 480; AG 140.  Leibniz favoured Leeuwenhoek’s animalist position; 
Malebranche, the ovism of Malpighi and Swammerdam. See DMR 175, n6.  
admitted human souls, the alignment with Leibniz breaks down as soon as we go 
beyond these to consider the possibility of non-human souls in plants and animals. 
These, Malebranche firmly denied and, unlike Leibniz, Malebranche never appealed 
to the microscopic evidence to support such an opinion.15 We find that the association 
with Malebranche is further undermined when we attend more closely to Leibniz’s 
choice of terminology, first with respect to the changes that occur in organic bodies 
and, second, with regard to the changes undergone by the animals and other living 
beings to which these bodies belong. Leibniz described the former as mere 





4. Preformation versus Transformation 
 
Leibniz took great care to distinguish preformation and transformation. Preformation 
was attributed to the organic body or seed, but transformation or metamorphosis was 
attributed solely to the animal. Animals or corporeal substances are transformed; 
organic bodies or seeds are only preformed. The difference was stated most clearly at 
Monadology §74:  
 
… today, when exact inquiries on plants, insects, and animals have shown us that 
organic bodies in nature are never produced from chaos or putrefaction, but always 
through seeds in which there is, no doubt, some preformation, it has been judged that, 
not only the organic body was already there before conception, but there was also a 
soul in this body; in brief, the animal itself was there, and through conception this 
animal was merely prepared for a great transformation, in order to become an animal 
of another kind. Something similar is seen outside generation, as when worms 
become flies, and caterpillars become butterflies (sec. 86, 89; Preface ***5.b. ff; sec. 
90, 187, 188, 403, 86, 397) (Monadology, §74, GP VI, 619-20; AG 222).16 
 
                                                 
15 For all Leibniz’s protestations, on this point, the scientific evidence must be silent. No empirical 
confirmation of the presence of immaterial perceiving souls in animals or in their seeds can be 
provided solely by the observation of their physical bodies.  
16 See also, Principles of Nature and Grace, §6; GP VI, 601; AG 209. 
The transformations described here involve changes of the animal’s bodily shape that 
are so radical that the animal, post-transformation, may be regarded as belonging to a 
different species. The transformed animal becomes “an animal of another kind”. 
Among the appended references to the Theodicy, Leibniz directs us to one we have 
already had occasion to mention, Theodicy §397. There, Leibniz had written of souls 
whose organic bodies are “preformed and predisposed to assume one day the human 
shape”, distinguishing these bodies from “the other small animals or seminal living 
beings, in which no such thing is pre-established” (Theodicy §397; GP VI, 352; H 
361; my emphasis). Even Leibniz’s homuncular-sounding example of the multi--
layered Harlequin was qualified in keeping with the notion that preformed bodies can 
change dramatically change their shape, for Leibniz went on in the New Essays 
passage quoted earlier to explain that we should not conceive the tiny bodies within 
larger bodies as exact replicas of the latter. “Nature’s artifice” is not so crude. What is 
replicated in the smaller regions of the organic body does not exactly resemble the 
original:   
 
the infinity of replications of its organic body which an animal contains are not as 
alike as suits of clothes, and nor are they arranged one on top of another, since 
nature’s artifice is of an entirely different order of subtlety (New Essays, A VI, 6, 
328; RB 328).   
 
From the observation that some souls will one day possess bodies that assume the 
figures of creatures belonging to different species, we may infer that Leibniz intended 
that the transformation of an animal be understood, not as a simple “augmentation” in 
the Malebranchian sense of merely becoming bigger, but rather as a process through 
which the creature acquires a new outward appearance. When a body takes on the 
shape of a human being, there is a real transformation of the animal (the body 
together with a soul) as its body assumes a shape typical of members of an altogether 
different species. The body acquires a new shape; it does not simply re-configure and 
increase in size (augment) the organs that the body already possessed in miniature.17   
                                                 
17 Although the issue is of course highly relevant, I will not divert our attention here to the methods of 
species classification preferred by Leibniz and contrasted in the New Essays with Locke’s 
thoroughgoing nominalism.  For discussion of Leibniz on the classification of biological species, see 
Smith (2011, 235-274). 
 Augmentation as growth or nourishment is of course still required in addition 
to transformation. Ordinarily, Leibniz referred to ‘transformations’ as ‘developments’, 
as when he stated that ‘generation is thus merely the growth of a changed 
(transformé) and developed (developpé) animal’ (Reflections on the doctrine of a 
single universal spirit, GP VI, 534; L 557). The development of the animal (its 
transformation) goes hand in hand with its growth (or augmentation). Nevertheless, 
the two procedures are not one and the same.  Elsewhere, Leibniz described the 
generation of the animal as a transformation and a “kind of augmentation” (New 
System, GP IV, 480; AG 140). The unfolding of the animal as a creature of another 
species is a sophisticated growth, nourishment or augmentation combined with 
transformation or development. The distinction and combination of transformation 
with augmentation or growth is also evident in the passage cited earlier from his 6 
February letter to Sophie, in which Leibniz had declared that “the apparent generation 
of a new plant or new animal is only a growth and transformation of a plant or animal 
which already subsists in the seeds” (Strickland (2011, 348), GP VII, 568). It is 
evident too in Leibniz’s remark in the Reflections on the doctrine of a single universal 
spirit that “seeds already contain the formed plant or animal, although it still needs 
transformation and nourishment, or growth (accroissement), to become an animal of 
the kind which our ordinary senses can observe” (GP VI, 534; L 557).18   
 In sharp contrast, Malebranche never embellished his theory of preformation 
as augmentation with a theory of the transformation of the animal. Instead, 
Malebranche insisted upon understanding the so-called transformations from larvae 
into fully-fledged flies and butterflies as simple augmentations. When, in the 
Dialogues on Metaphysics and on Religion, Theotimus claims, incorrectly as it turns 
out, that the Ant-Lion or “Formica-leo” transforms itself into a dragonfly, 
Malebranche’s mouthpiece, Theodore, ridicules the idea, likening it to the idea of a 
mole being turned into a blackbird. An animal of one type cannot be transformed into 
an animal of a different kind.19  Indeed, Malebranche thought that generation via 
different species would require that God intervene in particular instances, acting by 
particular volitions rather than relying on the general or universal operation of the 
                                                 
18  In the Considerations on the Principles of Life and on Plastic Natures, Leibniz described death and 
generation as “only the transformation of the same animal, which is sometimes augmented and 
sometimes diminished” (GP VI, 543; L 589). This can be read as claiming either that the 
transformation itself is subjected to augmentation or that it is the transformed animal that is augmented. 
In either case, however, transformation is presented as something more than mere augmentation. 
19 Dialogues on Metaphysics and on Religion, Dialogue XI; R-L I, 878; DMR 200. 
laws of motion to generate new life. To believe otherwise, he claimed, would 
denigrate God’s intelligence: “[f]or to suppose that God ordained some intellect … to 
maintain the species and from it always to form new ones, is to render divine 
providence human, and make it bear the character of a limited intelligence” 
(Dialogues on Metaphysics and on Religion, Dialogue XI; R-L II, 879; DMR 201).20   
 However, Malebranche contended, the mechanical generation of new 
creatures within the same species is possible so long as the arrangement of the infinity 
or organs is pre-formed in advance by God in such a way that every creature contains 
the seeds of all its progeny for evermore. As we have seen, all that is then required to 
pave the path to adulthood is growth or nourishment through the accretion of matter 
and re-configuration, through motion, of the organs.  Bees provide the paradigm case:  
 
all the organic [organiques] parts of bees are formed in their larvae, and are so well 
proportioned to the laws of motion that they can grow [peuvent croître] through their 
own construction and through the efficacy of these laws, and can assume the shape 
suitable to their condition, without God intervening anew through extraordinary 
providence (ibid. R-L II, 874; DMR 195-96).21  
 
Nevertheless, the universal operation of the general laws of motion is useful only in 
blindly and deterministically re-configuring and augmenting organs that are already in 
situ. They cannot effect the initial creation and organisation of the infinity of parts of 
each and every creature that will ever exist: “the general laws of the communication 
of motion are too simple to construct organic bodies [des corps organisés]” (ibid., R-
L II, 873; DMR 195).  Consequently, whatever is not literally in the seeds at the 
beginning cannot arise later through the mere mechanical laws of nature:  
 
if these tiny embryos, or rather these embryos of embryos of embryos, and so on, did 
not have a crystalline lens, for example, or optic nerve, or the leading block I 
                                                 
20 See also R-L II, 881; DMR 203. 
21 Malebranche also appealed to God’s strict application of the universal laws of motion and His refusal 
to intervene in particular instances in order to account for the frequent occurrences of  “monstrous 
animals” (DMR 196, R-L II, 874). See also Search After Truth (R-L I, 183; LO 118) where God’s 
adherence to the criteria of simplicity, continuity, and order are highlighted: “having had a plan to 
produce an admirable work by the simplest means, and to link all His creatures with one another, He 
foresaw certain effects that would necessarily follow from the order and nature of things”. That this 
would sometimes give rise to monstrous births in humans and other living things “did not deter Him 
from his plan”.   
discussed,22 or the first rudiments of all those parts destined to the same end, it is 
clear that the general laws of motion would never have been able to construct them. 
(Search After Truth, Last Elucidation – Elucidation on Optics, R-L I, 1099; LO 741-
42)23 
 
On the inability of matter to construct organised bodies with infinitely many parts and 
the need to introduce initial divine preformation, Leibniz was in complete agreement 
with Malebranche. He agreed wholeheartedly that preformation is a necessity because 
“there is no mechanism which is able to draw from an unformed mass a body 
endowed with an infinite number of organs, such as is that of an animal” (Leibniz to 
Sophie, 6 February 1706, Strickland 2011, 348, GP VII, 568). And even though 
Leibniz allowed species-changing transformations, he also agreed that matter 
operating solely by the laws of motion was sufficient to bring about the unfolding of 
the animals’ preformed organic bodies. For Leibniz, the preformed changes to the 
organic body needed to accomplish the transformation of the animal are produced by 
purely mechanical means.  As he told Samuel Clarke:  
 
The organism of animals is a mechanism which supposes a divine preformation: what 
follows from it, is purely natural, and wholly mechanical (Leibniz’s Fifth letter to 
Clarke, GP VII, 417-18; Alexander 93).   
 
Divine preformation sets the original conditions. For Malebranche, these constitute in 
miniature the body that will eventually emerge. Having rejected transformations, 
Malebranche proposed that seeds and eggs contain all that they need and do not take 
in nourishment from outside until they are ready to hatch and to grow full maturity.24 
Anything less than the complete formation of the creature in miniature in the seed 
would require God’s particular volitional intervention over and above the general 
operation of the laws of motion.  However, there seems in principle no reason why 
                                                 
22 See Search After Truth, R-L I, 1070-71; LO 723.  
23 See also, Dialogues on Metaphysics and on Religion, Dialogue XI; R-L II, 884; DMR 205. 
24 “The silkworm is nourished by the leaves of the mulberry tree, but the tiny worm contained in the 
egg is nourished by nothing; it has everything it needs next to it. True, it does not always eat. But it 
conserves itself without eating, and for six thousand years has been conserving itself. We find it strange 
that certain animals spend the winter without nourishment. What a marvel it is, then, that silkworms 
organize their nourishment so exactly, that they lack it precisely only when they are strong enough to 
break out of their prison and when the mulberry trees have spouted tender leaves to nourish them 
anew” (Dialogues on Metaphysics and on Religion, Dialogue XI, R-L I, 881; LO 202). 
God’s particular volitions should be required in order that animals and plants might 
be, not merely augmented, but actually transformed into creatures of a different 
species. There is no need, as Malebranche would have it, to limit God’s intelligence 
or to require His miraculous intervention from time to time. Could not God simply 
preform seeds in such a way that shapes different from the one originally bestowed 
might come about over time through interactions with external things? Divine 
omniscience, foreseeing all the motions and interactions of bodies, would surely know 
exactly which initial states (that is, which primary seeds) were needed in order that 
they should assume their different species shapes in due course. The crystalline lens 
need not present fully formed from the beginning. It can emerge through (internal and 
external) mechanical processes over time. The primary seeds are not required to have 
everything they need from the very beginning; they can acquire what they need over 
time, through mechanical interactions with others. Once preformed, mechanism alone 
could bring about all the changes required in individuals’ organic bodies, even those 
radical changes of bodily shape that result in their changing species membership.  
 However, if the laws of mechanics do suffice to maintain the functions of 
reproduction, nutrition and self-repair and even to bring about the requisite changes of 
shape and structure of the organic body, if everything in nature does simply unfold 
through mechanical collisions and motion, then we still lack justification of Leibniz’s 
claim that preformation requires that seeds and other organic bodies possess souls. 
Malebranche and Leibniz agreed that preformation together with mechanism is 
sufficient to produce the organic bodies of animals. Malebranche did not attribute 
souls to seeds. The question remains, why should Leibniz?   
 
 
5. Transformations, Continuity and Identity 
 
In itself, the doctrine preformation itself seems unable to justify Leibniz’s attribution 
of souls to preformed seeds. Might the animal transformations brought about by 
changes to their preformed bodies fare better? Certainly, all transformations of living 
beings are dependent upon the preformations of their organic-bodies. No living thing 
can be transformed into a creature of a different species unless its organic body 
assumes the shape typical of members of that species.25 If animal transformations can 
be demonstrated to require the presence of souls, then at least in those cases where 
transformations occur, the preformed bodies, as the organic bodies of ensouled 
creatures, would also be shown to possess souls. And if all preformed bodies are 
organic bodies of transformed living creatures, we would have the foundation on 
which to build a case for the presence of souls in all seeds. Whether rightly or 
wrongly, Leibniz himself believed that transformations are not unusual occurrences. 
Those few that are observable are only visible instances of a process that is prevalent 
throughout the created world:  
 
nature has this tact and goodness in revealing its secrets to us in small samples and 
thus making us infer the rest, everything being in correspondence and harmony. It is 
this which nature shows us in the transformation of caterpillars and other insects, for 
flies too come from worms, to help us grasp that there are transformations 
everywhere (Reflections on the doctrine of a single universal spirit, GP VI, 533; L 
557). 
 
But do living things really need to possess souls if they are to undergo 
transformations?  One might suppose that the soul is required to maintain the 
continuity of the species-changing animal over time. Certainly, Leibniz believed that 
the animal persists throughout the momentous changes precipitated by the altered 
shape of its body: “the animal itself will always remain throughout these 
transformations, just as the silkworm and the butterfly are one and the same animal” 
(Reflections on the doctrine of a single universal spirit: GP VI, 533; L 557). However, 
I have found no evidence of Leibniz arguing for the existence of the soul as a means 
of securing the continuous diachronic identity of the animal through species 
transformation. Indeed, his preference seems to have been to argue from the prior 
existence of the organic body to the existence of the soul and the animal itself, not 
from the pre-existence of the soul or ensouled animal to the existence of its organic 
body.26 
                                                 
25 In the Principles of Nature and Grace, Leibniz even inferred the transformation of the animal or 
plant from the preformation of the seed: “Modern investigations have taught us, and reason confirms it, 
that living things whose organs are known to us, that is, plants and animals, do not come from 
putrefaction or chaos, as the ancients believed, but from preformed seeds, and consequently, from the 
transformation of preexistent living beings” (§6, GP VI, 601; AG 209). 
26 Monadology §74, GP VI, 619.  
 In any case, arguing in favour of the soul as guarantor of the continuing 
identity of the animal through change may simply beg the question. After all, the 
outward appearance has utterly changed, so strictly speaking, the evidence suggests 
that the first animal has disappeared and has been replaced by another. Nevertheless, 
eager to believe that the same animal has persisted throughout, the temptation is great 
to propose a theory of transformation over replacement. When Descartes had 
suggested that the soft, transparent, melted wax by his fireside was the same as the 
hard, opaque object that had been at his fireside before the fire was lit, his assessment 
could not be based on empirical evidence, but had to depend upon his forming an 
intellectual judgement that begged the question whether the same object really did 
persist despite the changes in its outward appearance. Maintaining that the same 
animal persists through similarly radical changes to the shape, size and general 
appearance of its body is equally questionable. Just as Descartes lacked a watertight 
assurance that it really is the same wax, so too there is no full-proof evidence that the 
caterpillar is the same animal as the butterfly and the latter has not simply taken the 
place of the former.27    
 Such quibbles may be set aside, however, for Leibniz’s approach was quite 
different.  When commenting on Ralph Cudworth’s theory of plastic natures in a 
paper published in the May 1705 issue of the Histoire des Ouvrages des Savants, 
Leibniz proposed that the organic body itself is indestructible, thus effectively 
avoiding the Cartesian problem of how to justify the continuing identity of the animal 
through the radical changes to its organic body. In that paper, Leibniz did not appeal 
to the presence of a unifying soul in order to secure the sameness of the animal whose 
body is in constant flux.  Instead, he proposed that the organic body itself remains the 
same throughout. Its composition or structure alone guarantees its physical 
indestructibility and ensures its identity even through radical and species-altering 
changes of shape.  Living bodies – here described as “mechanisms of nature” -- have 
                                                 
27 Besides this, many common alterations to bodies are not judged to be transformations of an animal 
from one species to another. Wine turns into vinegar, milk into cheese. Why should we consider the 
change from caterpillar to butterfly as anything more than the ordinary changes that happen to 
inanimate masses? One response is to highlight the generative capacities of living things. Wine turns 
into vinegar, but vinegar never becomes wine. Caterpillars, on the other hand, become butterflies and 
butterflies then produce the larvae of future caterpillars, completing the natural cycle of the birth and 
death of living things. On the self-sustaining and self-reproducing abilities of living things, see Smith 
(2011, 70-72). Generally, biological reproduction is effected through the production of seeds or eggs. 
This too, however, begs the question as to whether seeds and other means of generative replication are 
rightly regarded as signs of life and the presence of souls.  
an infinite number of parts, each of which is itself a mechanism with infinite parts.28  
Nature’s mechanisms are indestructible because their mechanical structure proceeds 
to the infinitely small:  
 
since the mechanisms of nature are mechanisms down to their smallest parts, they are 
indestructible, since smaller machines are enfolded in greater machines into infinity 
(Considerations on Vital Principles and Plastic Natures, GP VI, 543; L 589).29 
 
Leibniz’s Harlequin example discussed earlier traced a similar line of thought:  
 
the machines of nature are as imperishable as souls themselves, and the animal 
together with its soul persists for ever. I can explain my meaning better with the help 
of a pleasant though very silly example: it is as if someone tried to strip Harlequin on 
the stage but could never finish the task because he had on so many costumes, one on 
top of the other (New Essays, A VI, 6, 328; RB 328). 
 
Putting to one side the multiplicity of questions and difficulties associated with this 
justification of corporeal indestructibility on account of their infinitely enfolded 
structures, 30 it is clear that Leibniz himself believed that bodies’ infinitely nested 
structures are sufficient to guarantee that one can never completely destroy an organic 
body for one could never completely destroy all of its (infinitely many) versions. 
However, if the organic body is in itself indestructible and remains the same through 
the change from seed to plant or animal and beyond, there would seem to be no need 
for each and every organic body also to be endowed with its own dominant soul nor 
any reason why the organic body should belong to a transformed animal. The 
                                                 
28 For Leibniz, the infinitely divided nature of the body of the corporeal substance identifies it as a 
living body and marks the distinctive difference between machines of divine construction and those 
made by mere humans that have only a finite number of parts. For discussion, see Nachtomy (2011).  
29 Having earlier in the paper asserted his belief in the existence and immortality of the soul, Leibniz 
continued: “Thus, one finds himself forced to maintain at the same time both the pre-existence of the 
soul with that of the animal and also the subsistence of the animal with that of the soul” (GP VI, 543; L 
589).  
30 The notion sits uneasily beside Leibniz’s more usual stance whereby composite bodies, because they 
are composite, are naturally destructible (e.g. Monadology §6, GP VI, 607; AG 213). Moreover, the 
animate machine or living organic body is in constant flux, with parts leaving and others arriving at 
every moment.  There is no inherent unity among them. If it is said that the animate body does possess 
a unity that persists despite the flux of its parts, this implicitly re-introduces the soul as the source of 
that unity, contrary to Leibniz’s reasoning here. If, as is implied here, indestructibility is due to the 
similarity of the infinitely enfolded parts, a non-Leibnizian animalculism is indicated, while if the parts 
are not exactly the same and change of species can occur, the continuing identity of the animal (and 
hence also its indestructibility) is assumed, not proven.  
diachronic identity of the body has been secured by appeal to its internal composition 
and, other than support for the belief that each organic body is the body of a 
perceiving, appetitive living being – a fact that we can be certain of only in our own 
case 31  – the attribution of souls to non-human organic bodies has nothing to 
contribute. Non-human animals, plants and other living creatures might indeed, as 
Malebranche believed, be nothing more than infinitely complex soul-less machines.  
 
 
6. Souls, preformation and causation 
 
Up to now, we have found no reason within Leibniz’s accounts of animal 
transformations or the bodily preformations on which they depend to support Leibniz 
against the Malebranchean threat of soul-less seeds and living bodies. In this last 
section, however, we examine a powerful argument based on the nature of matter and 
its mechanical operation that sheds light on why Leibniz believed that the unfolding 
of preformed bodies – and hence also by extension the pre-established successive 
transformations of animals and plants – presupposes and depends upon their 
possessing perceiving, indivisible souls. Preformed matter can operate mechanically 
(by collisions), it will be argued, only if that matter is itself imbued throughout with 
souls. Consequently, as we shall see, the preformation-transformation relation is 
symbiotic: the transformation of the animal depends upon the preformation of its 
organic body, but equally, the unfolding of the preformed matter is dependent upon 
there being unified, en-souled and transformable creatures.  
 Preformed bodies, for both Malebranche and Leibniz, are composed of 
infinitely many, intricately organised part or organs.  Such plurality of parts, Leibniz 
contended despite the argument discussed in the previous section, requires principles 
of unity, namely souls.   Anticipating the iconic argument at the opening of the 
Monadology, he declared in the New System that,    
 
a simple mass of matter, however organized it may be … can only be considered as 
an army or a herd, or a pond full of fish, or like a watch composed of springs and 
                                                 
31 Leibniz does argue elsewhere that we can extrapolate from our own experience to the probability that 
other creatures have experiences also. See Phemister (2004).  
wheels. Yet if there were no true substantial unities, there would be nothing 
substantial or real in the collection (New System, GP IV, 482; AG 142). 
 
The argument is familiar. To avoid falling into the labyrinth of the composition of the 
material continuum and its regression of never-ending divisibility, it is necessary to 
postulate the existence of metaphysical atoms, substantial indivisible unities upon 
which divisible aggregate bodies can be founded. Souls or substantial forms are the 
means by which the requisite unity is introduced into aggregate bodies (ibid.). Bodily 
indestructibility notwithstanding, an aggregate is a unified organic body only when it 
is in possession of a dominant soul or substantial form.    
 With respect to preformed seeds, this establishes only that the parts from 
which the seed is composed must possess unifying souls if the seed is to be an 
aggregate body. As an aggregate, it must be constituted by or founded upon 
substantial unities. It does not determine whether the seed itself must also possess its 
own dominant soul that unifies the otherwise indestructible aggregate body nor does it 
establish any specific role for such a dominant soul in the preformation of the seed 
itself.  
 A crucial role for the soul is forthcoming, however. If successful, Leibniz’s 
claims will demonstrate that matter, in order that it be preformed, must be imbued 
throughout with souls or their equivalents, entelechies or substantial forms and will 
put to rest the notion that Malebranchean soulless merely extended animal and plant 
bodies and seeds can be subjected to preformation. In a letter written in the spring of 
1687, Leibniz suggested to Arnauld that it is only through the perceiving substance’s 
“representation of the whole universe according to its point of view” and its gathering 
together of the “impressions (or rather relationships) which its body receives 
mediately or immediately from all others”, that  
 
the lineaments [les traits] of the future are formed in advance and that the indications 
[les traces] of the past are preserved for ever in each thing, and that cause and effect 
adapt to one another precisely down to the detail of the smallest circumstance, 
although every effect depends upon an infinite number of causes and every cause has 
an infinite number of effects… (to Arnauld, 30 April 1687, GP II, 98; Mason 123).32 
 
                                                 
32 I am indebted to Dr Jeremy Dunham for reminding me of this passage.  
Nothing can be “formed in advance” and nothing can be preserved unless each 
organic body has a dominant soul, entelechy or substantial form, together with which 
it becomes a complete indivisible corporeal substance, for only the perceiving soul 
has the requisite unity that makes possible the complete representation in a single 
instant of past, present and future states of the universe in the animal itself. The soul 
is the immaterial point at which all preceding causes of the present effect converge. It 
acts both as the place-holder for an infinity of future effects and as the present locus 
of memories of an infinite number of past effects.  And without the soul’s complete 
representation by which the animal holds all the  “lineaments of the future” in itself 
and preserves the “indications of the past”, the animal’s body would be unable to 
enter into causal relations with other bodies and thus would not be able to unfold in 
accordance with its preformation. In short, neither causation nor preformation would 
be possible if, as Malebranche and other Cartesians believed, “the essence of matter 
consisted of a certain shape, movement, or modified version of extension which was 
determined” (ibid., GP II, 98-99; Mason 123). 
 Leibniz offered a similar argument to the Electress Sophie. In his letter of 6 
February 1706, he explained that the soul must not only receive the diverse 
impressions made on its body through interaction with others across the entire 
universe, but it must also “disentangle” (demêler) them.  
 
[N]ature alone in fact receives all impressions and brings them together into one, but 
without the soul the order of the impressions matter has received could not be 
disentangled, and the impressions would only be confused. Each assignable point of 
matter has a different motion from every other point assignable to it, and its motion is 
composed of all preceding impressions; but this impression is as simple as those 
which compose it, and no composition can be recognized in it (to Sophie, 6 February 
1706; GP VII, 570; Strickland 350). 
 
Each body, each portion of aggregate matter, is affected by all others. The infinitely 
many preceding impressions can be impressed only on an infinitely divided body, but 
in order for them to be effective both as causes of a creature’s present and future 
states, these infinitely many impressions must be “disentangled” by the body’s soul 
that holds them all together in a single moment. Without such disentanglement, “the 
impressions would only be confused”.  Presumably, then, the soul’s disentanglement 
consists in differentiation of the various impressions, some of which will be perceived 
more distinctly than others. As he went on to explain, even though all past 
impressions are causally efficacious in bringing about the creature’s current state of 
being and all must be represented in its soul’s perceptions (for “the entire effect must 
always express its cause”), it is only “where the preceding impressions are 
distinguished and preserved” that the soul is present (ibid.).    
 To fully appreciate the importance of the soul’s disentangling distinctions, we 
must return to Leibniz’s 30 April 1687 letter to Arnauld. Leibniz began this letter by 
re-iterating the claim made in an earlier letter 33  that “the soul expresses more 
distinctly (all other things being equal) what pertains to its body” (GP II, 90; Mason 
113). It is in this way that the soul perceives the rest of the universe by means of its 
body’s sense organs, distinctly perceiving the effects made on its own body by 
external bodies.34 By disentangling the infinite multitude of impressions, perceiving 
some more distinctly than others, the soul is firmly situated ‘in’ its body. By 
perceiving more distinctly the impressions made on its own body and thereby 
perceiving the world through its sense organs, the organic body becomes the spatial 
location for the soul’s unique point of view or perspectival representation of the 
universe.35   
 Keeping these points in mind, we are now in a better position to comprehend 
Leibniz’s cryptic remarks to Sophie. Following on from his remarks cited above, he 
remarked, “It is true and very noteworthy that, by taking this point together with the 
matter which surrounds it, there is a way of disentangling the past” (to Sophie, 6 
February 1706; GP VII 570; Strickland 350). The “point” in question is the soul as the 
unique “point of view” on the universe; the “matter which surrounds it” is the soul’s 
organic body. In this “surrounding matter”, he continued, are the “infinite varieties of 
shapes and motions … which preserve something of all preceding effects”, all of 
which impressions are held united in the soul’s perspectival perception. “[F]or this 
reason”, he concluded, “every soul is accompanied by an organic body which 
corresponds to it” (ibid.). In short, the soul must have an infinitely divided body 
                                                 
33 To Arnauld, 28 November/ 8 December 1686; GP II, 74; Mason 92. 
34 “[W]e perceive other bodies only through their relationship to ours” (to Arnauld, 9 October 1687; 
GP II, 113; Mason 145). 
35 Thus, Leibniz continued, although the soul expresses the whole universe, unless it perceives some 
things more distinctly than others, “there would be no distinction between souls” (to Arnauld 30 April 
1687; GP II, 90; Mason 113).   
 
capable of receiving the infinity of impressions made on it from outside. 
Correspondingly, since the effect must represent its entire cause, the organic body, if 
it is to be an effect of all these impressions, must be in possession of a soul that holds 





The remarkable theory outlined in the previous section has startling consequences for 
the very possibility of a mechanical philosophy styled on the Cartesian model. If 
indeed, a piece of matter or its motion cannot be the effect of any preceding cause 
unless it is able to contain in a single indivisible point, and to disentangle, the entirety 
of preceding impressions made by all past bodies, then no soul-less inanimate, 
divisible body, such as Malebranche and Descartes theorised, can be the effect of (can 
be affected by) any other body. If we accept Leibniz’s conditions, then effects can be 
felt only in bodies that have dominant souls or substantial forms. When the soul 
collates the myriad impressions on its body and perceives some more distinctly than 
others, its body not only becomes the spatialised point from which the universe is 
perceived, it also becomes a particularised effect of the myriad causes that led to its 
current state of movement or resistance. Thus, when an aggregate of substances lacks 
a dominant soul – when it is a mere inanimate object – the effects on the body will be 
felt only in the constituent ensouled substances. Only when the body as a whole is an 
organic body dominated by its own soul is the whole body itself an effect of the 
preceding causes.  
 The implications for the possibility of Malebranchean preformed seeds are 
serious. Malebranche’s soul-less seeds are composed entirely of equally soul-less 
organised parts. But if Leibniz’s argument holds, then seeds can be preformed only if 
they contain the “lineaments of the future” and they can unfold their futures only if 
they are able to be “effects”, that is to be affected by preceding causes. Thus, they 
must, as Leibniz has claimed, also preserve the “indications of the past”. Neither is 
possible, Leibniz has argued, unless the seed possesses a dominant soul or substantial 
form. Moreover, both Leibniz and Malebranche held that each preformed seed has 
infinitely many parts.  If the body as a whole is to be affected, each of these 
constituent parts must also be acted upon. But each part can be an effect only if has a 
soul dominant over it and uniting the impressions it receives through each of its 
smaller parts. Hence, each preformed seed, contrary to what Malebranche believed, 
must contain an infinite number of souls or substantial forms, each dominant over its 
own particular part of the infinitely divided seed. Thus, souls really are in preformed 
seeds, one as dominant over the whole and each of the others dominant over one of 
the seed’s myriad parts respectively. 
 Finally, we may note that, despite Malebranche’s protestations against animal 
transformations, if each preformed seed must be the organic body of a living, 
ensouled, corporeal substance or animal-like living entity, then all preformed changes 
in the organic body are also transformations of the animal itself. 36  Neither the 
preformation of the organic body or seed with its infinitely many parts nor the various 
transformations of the animal to which this body belongs could take place in the 
absence of the unifying and collecting soul. Transformations of the animal depend 
upon the preformed changes to its organic body, but equally, the preformed changes 
in the organic body are dependent upon the presence of the dominant soul of the 
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